Apple v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019)

Plaintiffs are four iPhone owners. Defendant is Apple Inc. (“Apple”), a technology company best known for computers and smartphone devices.

In 2007, Apple introduced the long-anticipated “iPhone.” The following year, Apple launched its version of a retail store called the “App Store” where iPhone owners can purchase electronic applications (“apps”) directly from Apple. These apps enable iPhone users to accomplish such tasks as transferring money, ordering car services, or buying event tickets. The “App Store” became so successful that the phrase “there’s an app for that” became a common twenty-first century American saying.1

Most apps in the App Store are not created by their seller, Apple. Instead, many apps are created by third-party developers under strict contracts for distribution. To sell an app in the App Store, developers agree to pay Apple an annual $99 membership fee. Apple allows the developer to set the retail sale price, but requires that price to end in $0.99. Additionally, developers must consent to Apple’s thirty percent commission, which it collects from each app sale.

Today, Apple’s App Store contains almost two million apps. These apps are available, legally, only for purchase through Apple’s App Store while on an iPhone.

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al. 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019)

Petitioner is Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation (“Fourth Estate”), a news organization. Respondent is Wall-Street.com, LLC (“Wall- Street”), a news website. Fourth Estate licensed content to Wall-Street. Upon cancellation or expiration of the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove the content from its website.

When Fourth Estate cancelled the licensing agreement, Wall-Street refused to remove the provided content. As a result, Fourth Estate brought a copyright infringement lawsuit against Wall-Street.

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)

Respondent Eric Brunetti (“Brunetti” or “Respondent”) owns the trademark FUCT, which is used in connection with clothing goods and as theclothing’s brand name. Brunetti applied for federal registration of his mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Although Brunetti claimed that his trademark was pronounced as four consecutive, individual letters, and not as a single word, the mark was largely perceived as “the equivalent of the past participle form of a well-known word of profanity.”1

After Brunetti’s application was denied by both the USPTO and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) under §2(a)(2) of the Lanham Act,which bars registration of “immoral or scandalous” trademarks, Brunetti brought a First Amendment challenge to the bar in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals invalidated the “immoral or scandalous” bar as viewpoint-based and unconstitutional.

Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019)

Respondent Tempnology, LLC (“Tempnology”) owned intellectual property related to, and manufactured, athletic attire and accessories designed to stay cool during exercise. Petitioner Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (“Mission”) licensed Tempnology’s trademark of “Coolcore.” Tempnology’s Coolcore trademark distinguished its athletic attire from competing athletic wear companies by providing breathable cool attire for exercise.

In 2012, Tempnology and Mission contracted to give Mission an exclusive license to distribute Coolcore products and a non-exclusive license to use the Coolcore trademark worldwide. The contract was set to expire in July 2016. However, in 2015, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy after experiencing massive operating losses. Tempnology then moved to reject its licensing agreement with Mission under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,1 which allows a debtor to reject any executory contract—a contract neither party finished performing—with court approval. This removes the burden of performance from the debtor. Section 365(a) allows a debtor to decide whether performing the executory contract, and benefiting from the other party’s performance, is in the debtor’s best interest. If performing the contract is not in its best interest, it may reject the agreement. In this case, Tempnology filed to reject the licensing agreement the day after filing for bankruptcy.

Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019)

Plaintiff Mitch Hungerpiller received a patent (No. 6,836,548) in 2004 for a digitized method of identifying and processing undeliverable and returned mail. As a result of this patent, he founded Return Mail, Inc. (“Return Mail”) using the patent as the basis for a company that provided the invention to corporate customers.

Defendant is the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), a federal agency that processes and distributes mail.

Prior to, and after, Return Mail received the patent, the company met with USPS to discuss licensing the product to USPS. According to Return Mail, the parties were near an agreement. However, nearly simultaneous to Return Mail’s patent grant, USPS introduced a similar product utilizing the Intelligent Mail barcode commonly known as OneCode.

USPS moved in 2006 to invalidate the patent held by Return Mail. Return Mail filed countersuit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking damages for unauthorized use of its invention. At that time, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) upheld Return Mail’s patent as valid.

In 2011, Congress passed sweeping changes to patent law in a bill known as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). The AIA created a three-part review to enable “a person” to challenge patent validity after issuance of the patent. Under the AIA, “a person” can challenge a patent in one of three ways: inter partes review (“IPR”); post-grant review (“PGR”); and covered business method review (“CBM”). The AIA created law by which a patent is challenged either in federal court as a defense to infringement claims, in ex parte review by the Patent Office, or under the three post-issue proceedings heard before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). It is through these mechanisms that the case made its way to the Supreme Court.

Rimini Street, Inc. et al. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873 (2019)

Respondent Oracle U.S.A. (“Oracle”) creates and licenses data software programs that administer data and operations for companies and non-profits. In addition to developing software, Oracle also offers maintenance services to its customers. Appellant Rimini Street Inc. (“Rimini”) is a competitor that offers third-party software maintenance services for Oracle software.

Oracle filed a complaint against Rimini and its CEO alleging copyright infringement, among other violations. Oracle sought damages for Rimini’s unauthorized use of its software. After judgement, the district court ordered Rimini to pay for litigation expenses which

included expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. Rimini appealed the decision, arguing these costs were not litigation expenses listed in 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1921 and were thus not enforceable.